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Abstract 
 
This paper aims at introducing a relative security measure, applicable to evaluating the 
impact of arms races on the military security of allies. This measure is based on 
demographic criteria, which play a dominant role in a number of arms races involving 
military alliances. The case of Greece and Cyprus, on one hand, and Turkey on the other, 
is the one to which our relative security measure is applied and tested. Artificial neural 
networks were trained to forecast the future behaviour of relative security. The high 
forecasting performance permitted the application of alternative scenarios for predicting 
the impact of the Greek - Turkish arms race on the relative security of the Greek - Cypriot 
alliance.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 The Greek - Cypriot Integrated Defence Space Doctrine has been regarded by the 
two parties involved as a strategy aiming at facing potential offensive action by Turkey 
against either of the two allies, with particular emphasis on the protection of their national 
interests in the Aegean Sea theatre. This paper does not aspire to criticise the effectiveness 
or otherwise of such a doctrine, since an attempt of this kind would touch upon sensitive 
issues requiring the use of classified information over and above the needs of scientific 
research. What one can certainly do, however, is attract the reader’s attention to certain 
related issues, which may contribute to drawing a number of conclusions regarding the 
usefulness or otherwise of similar strategies, in view of the latest developments 
concerning the relations of the three countries involved. 
 These conclusions refer to the extent to which the security of the two allies in the 
area is promoted given the arms race which has long been going on between Greece and 
Turkey (Kollias and Makrydakis 1997). Whereas the impact of an arms race on the 
economy of the countries involved in it has been extensively dealt within the literature 
(Balfoussias and Stavrinos 1996; Ozmucur 1996; Kollias 1997), research referring to the 
consequences of arms races upon the security of the sides involved leaves a great deal to 
contribute on the issue.  To forecast the impact of this arms race on the security of Greece 
and Cyprus we resort to using artificial neural networks, with all advantages a data driven 
approach may entail, given the complexity of the models employed by the theory of 
alliances and the contradictory empirical results (Hartley and Sandler 1995), as well as the 
limited theoretical background covering the concept of relative security in similar cases.  
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The technical support concerning the structure and training of the networks used is 
given in section 3, after the theoretical background, along with a description of the input 
variables and a brief review of the relevant literature have been presented in section 2. The 
forecasting results of the relative security factor, as well as a presentation and analysis of 
various alternative scenarios concerning arms race tactics between the countries involved 
are reported in section 4. Finally, section 5 sums up and concludes the findings of this 
paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE OVERVIEW AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 The topic of arms races in its general context has been a rather popular issue, 
which was thoroughly investigated in the literature (e.g. Richardson 1960; Intriligator 
1982; Isard and Anderton  1985 and 1988). Concerning the specific arms - race case 
between Greece and Turkey, earlier research has concluded that the pressure on the Greek 
economy resulting from this arms race is determined chiefly by demographic factors 
strongly favouring the Turkish side, while the estimation of input significance has 
indicated that the leading determinants of such a race describe the Turkish rather than the 
Greek economic and demographic environment (Andreou and Zombanakis 2000). Having 
established the above framework for the arms race between Greece and Turkey, we now 
proceed to investigate the extent to which its impact on the sides involved may be 
described by introducing a more specific and accurate measure compared to the 
hypothetical figures of a payoff matrix in the context of a game theory exercise (e.g. 
Wagner 1983).  Such a measure requires defining a Relative Security (RS) coefficient, 
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tailored to fit the environment of such a conflict involving Greece and Cyprus on one hand 
and Turkey on another. Ayanian (1994) has already employed such a security coefficient 
aiming at explaining exchange-rate fluctuations better than conventional macroeconomic 
variables. Combining Ayanian's reasoning on the subject together with our earlier 
conclusions regarding the leading role of population developments in the Greek - Turkish 
arms race, we have proceeded to determining an RS coefficient. This coefficient is 
suitable to use when measuring the impact of the Greek - Turkish arms race on the 
security of the two allies, namely Greece and Cyprus.  
 Following Ayanian (1994), we define the security of Greece and that of Cyprus in 
the context of an Integrated Defence Space Doctrine scenario as follows: 
SG = (1/ k) * [(FG + FC) / FTG]   (1) 
and 
SC = (1/ k) * [(FG + FC) / FTC]    (2) 
where  SG is the military security of Greece 
SC is the military security of Cyprus  
FG is total Greek defence forces 
FC is total Cypriot defence forces 
FTG is Turkish forces potentially directed against Greece 
FTC is Turkish forces potentially directed against Cyprus 
k is the probability of a conflict between the sides involved 
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 The measure of the relative security of Cyprus with reference to Greece RSCG, 
which is the quintessence of the Integrated Defence Space Doctrine between Greece and 
Cyprus, is defined as the ratio of (2) over (1): 
RSCG = [FTG / FTC]     (3) 
Turkish forces potentially directed against Greece and Cyprus can be considered as an 
increasing function of the relative population growth rates between Turkey on one hand 
and each of the two allies on the other. This specification is based on the conclusion drawn 
in the literature, as mentioned earlier on in this section, referring to the dominance of 
human resources over financial resources in determining the defence burden on the Greek 
economy as a result of the ongoing arms race with Turkey1. Thus, the corresponding 
relationships for the two allies, Greece and Cyprus, may be stated as follows: 
( )[ ]TGTTG p/pexpFF &&=     (4) 
and  
( )[ ]TCTTC p/pexpFF &&=     (5) 
 
where  FT  stands for the total of Turkish armed forces and , ,  denote the 
respective population growth rates for Greece, Cyprus and Turkey. The interpretation of 
(4) and (5) requires special attention due to the asymmetric effect of the variables 
involved: Thus, in a purely hypothetical case which would involve a faster growth of the 
Gp& Cp& Tp&
                                                     
1Indeed, any variable which represents or includes developments in human resources in the countries 
involved may be suitable. Since, however, population developments are decisive in affecting most of the 
human resource variables, we feel that their role must be acknowledged as leading. The use of population 
growth rates rather than the corresponding levels aims at stressing the dynamic character of the relative 
security measure proposed.    
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Greek or Cypriot population compared to that of Turkey, one may argue that this 
difference in the population rates involved may be considered as representing a potential 
threat to Turkey, which would, therefore, be compelled to channel more forces to face 
those of the two allies2. However, where the Turkish population exhibits a faster rate of 
growth compared to that of Greece or Cyprus, which has always been the case, this will 
allow Turkey to increase FT, which is the total Turkish forces, and provide for an increase 
of the forces facing Greece and Cyprus, thus offsetting the effect caused due to the 
reduction of the exponent.      
Substituting the equivalent of FTG and FTC from  (4) and (5) in (3) we come up with the 
following Relative Security (RS) measure between Greece and Cyprus: 
RSCG = exp[x]     (6) 
 
where       ( ) TCG p/p-px &&&=             (7) 
 
Equation (6) interpreted together with (7) show how the population rates of growth of the 
three countries involved are expected to affect the relative security of Cyprus with 
reference to Greece, as this is measured by RSCG. More specifically, for an increase of this 
index as given by (6), x at time t2 must be higher than x at an earlier period t1 (t1 and t2 
represent years in our case). In terms of (7), therefore,  x1 < x2 , or:              
    <   ( ) )1(p/)1(p-(1)p  TCG &&& ( ) )2(p/)2(p-(2)p TCG &&&     (7a) 
                                                                                                                                                                
2 Such extreme scenarios aim at just facilitating the interpretation of this relative security measure and must 
not be considered as reflecting reality by any means. 
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  Bearing in mind that RSCG as it is expressed by (6) and (7) measures the relative security 
of Cyprus, it is evident that (7a) holds true in the following three cases: 
a. If , holding  and constant, as shown by)2(p)1(p TT && > Gp& Cp&  equations (6) and (7). 
b. If , holding  and constant, since F)2(p)1(p CC && > Gp& Tp& TC in equation (5) will fall. 
c. If , holding  and  constant, since F)2(p)1(p GG && < Cp& Tp& TG in equation (4) will rise, 
meaning that Turkish forces are expected to move towards Greece and away from 
Cyprus. This case underlines the importance of the Greek support in the Greek – 
Cypriot alliance, in the context of which, all population growth rates not included in 
one of the above cases entail a decline of the RSCG, indicating a reduction of the 
relative security of Cyprus3. 
d. If all rates fluctuate, the direction of change of the RS will depend on the outcome of 
equation (7a), that is, RS will rise if the second term of (7a) is greater than the first. 
It is now evident that this relative security measure can be used to provide for a much 
more precise strategy payoff measure compared to the hypothetical payoffs used in the 
literature, as we indicated earlier in this section.  Indeed, if the percentage changes 
included in the exponent of (6) are instead denoted as logarithmic first differences, then 
the exponent x of the relative security measure RSCG in (7) may be expressed as follows: 
x = [ ln ( PG / PG(-1) ) - ln ( PC / PC(-1) ) ] / [ ln ( PT / PT(-1) ) ]  (8) 
where PG, PC and PT  stand for the populations of Greece, Cyprus and Turkey respectively. 
                                                     
3 We are thankful to an anonymous referee and to professor A. Bountis of the University of Patras, Greece, 
for their contribution to our analysis on this issue. 
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Denoting by g, c, and t the corresponding Greek, Cypriot and Turkish population 
increases, as given in (8) above, i.e: 
g = ln ( PG / PG(-1) )     (9) 
c = ln ( PC / PC(-1) )     (10) 
t = ln ( PT / PT(-1) )     (11) 
then, following Chiang (1984), x represents the algebraic solution of the following 
equation: 
        c * t
x - g = 0      (12) 
It is evident, therefore, that (12) provides the necessary theoretical framework within 
which a relative security coefficient may be developed and used to quantify the impact of 
the various strategies selected by the sides involved in an arms race.  
The benefits of introducing such a measure and applying it using neural networks 
are clear: 
a. It provides for a means to measure the impact of an arms race on the security of 
the allies involved in a much more specific way compared to the arbitrary payoffs found in 
the literature so far. Using, therefore, the relative security coefficient described in this 
paper, one may proceed to cardinal measurement comparisons among various arms race 
scenarios, thus drawing useful conclusions on the impact of such a race on the member 
states of an alliance.  
b. This Relative Security coefficient, by emphasising the role of demographic 
variables, is tailored to fit the case of specific categories of arms races, in which human 
resources play a dominant role, such as the one between Greece and Turkey. 
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It is important to remember, however, that the application of this relative security 
coefficient is not necessarily confined to cases of two - member alliances. In fact, the 
number of the member countries in an alliance does not impose any constraint, as long as 
one focuses on the relative security involving pairs of member countries each time, facing 
a common threat.  
 The relative security coefficient for the Greek - Cypriot alliance thus established 
represents the output of our network algorithm, using as input some of the leading 
determinants of the Greek - Turkish arms race (Stavrinos and Zombanakis 1998; Andreou 
and Zombanakis 2000), as well as the top performing variables during preliminary input 
significance exercises (Table 1). The input variables thus selected are the GDP as well as 
its share representing defence expenditure of the three countries involved. In addition, the 
GDP share of the non - defence spending in Greece and Cyprus have been employed in 
order to introduce the opportunity cost of defence and thus the dimension of the peace 
dividend in the analysis.   
 
3. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
 This section is devoted to present briefly the methodology of artificial neural 
networks. By using this data driven approach in forecasting the impact of the arms race on 
the security of the allies, one may avoid the complications arising due to the use of 
intricate models involving non-linearities, where, for example, the empirical results are 
occasionally contradictory. This approach is based on developing a “machine” composed 
of a number of basic computational elements called neurons, connected to each other 
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forming layers. A network is trained through general-purpose algorithms based on 
available data. The problem is reduced to the computation of weight neuron connections 
in a feed-forward network to accomplish a desired input-output mapping. The learning 
phase can be viewed as a high dimensional, non-linear, system identification problem. In a 
feed-forward Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) links from each neuron in the kth layer are 
being directed to each neuron in the (k+1)th layer. Inputs from the environment enter the 
first layer and outputs from the network are manifested at the last layer (Azoff 1994; 
Andreou and Zombanakis 2000).  
 The core architecture of our networks is the feed-forward MLP described above. 
Variations of this scheme were employed, such as the m-d-1 and m-d1-d2-1 topologies (m 
input nodes, one and two hidden layers respectively and one output) and a Multiply 
Activated (MA) one. The latter uses one hidden layer partitioned into three parallel sub-
layers activated by a different function (Figure 1). All networks developed have one 
output neuron, which yields the next sample (predicted value) in the time sequence. The 
training algorithm used is the well-known Error Back Propagation with a momentum term 
(e.g. Rumelhart and McLelland 1986; Azoff 1994). The networks are trained to learn and 
then predict the behaviour of the time-series presented in specific patterns of data. 
Detailed information regarding architectural and learning parameters can be found in the 
Appendix (A.1). 
 The networks used in the present paper were divided into three categories: The 
first one employs MLPs with a single hidden layer (category A), the second one includes 
MLPs with two successive hidden layers (category B) and the last one involves the 
 11
Multiply Activated MLP (MAMLP – category C) described above. Different topologies, 
as regards the number of nodes within the hidden layers, were implemented. In addition, 
variations of learning schemes were adopted, lying on different activation functions (Table 
2), such as: 
   Logistic sigmoid :                  (13) f y by( ) ( exp( ))= + − −1 1
 Hyperbolic tangent :   (14) 1))exp(1(*))exp(1()( −−+−−= bybyyf
 Gaussian : ( )2exp)( xyf −=     (15) 
 Gaussian complement : ( )2exp1)( xyf −−=     (16) 
where,                             (17) y wi i
i
n
=
=
∑
1
x
and xi’s denote the input values of a node, while wi’s the real valued weights of edges 
incident on a node and n the number of inputs to the node from the previous layer. b is 
known as the steepness of equations (13) and (14). The input layer is linear, while the 
output uses the sigmoid function.   
Our data series consist of 33 annual observations, 25 of which were included in the 
training set and 8 in the testing set. The forecasting horizon was set to one step ahead. 
Performance was evaluated using well known and widely used error measures (see 
Appendix, A.2), specifically the Normalized Root Mean Squared Error (NRMSE), the 
Correlation Coefficient (CC), the Mean Relative Error (MRE), the Mean Absolute Error 
(MAE) and the Mean Square Error (MSE). All these measures were evaluated on the 
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testing set of data, that is, a set of pattern values that did not participate during the course 
of learning.  
 An important aspect examined in the present analysis is the determination of the 
significance ordering of the variables involved, that is, the selection of the variables that 
contribute more to the forecasting process. This task can be performed using the notions of 
input sensitivity analysis, described extensively in Refenes et. al. (1995) and Azoff (1994), 
based on which one can sum up the absolute values of the weights fanning from each input 
variable into all nodes in the successive hidden layer, thus estimating the overall 
connection strength of this variable. The input variables that have the highest connection 
strength can then be considered as most significant, in the sense of affecting the course of 
forecasting in a more pronounced way compared to others. Presenting the analytical 
technical background behind these notions is beyond the scope of this work, since the 
reader may refer to the sources stated above for further information. 
 
4. POLICY SIMULATIONS  
 The RS coefficient seems to be quite successful in predicting the impact on the 
relative security of Cyprus with reference to Greece, in the context of an arms race 
between the two allies on one hand and Turkey on the other, using the input variables 
described earlier. As indicated in Table 3, the error figures during the training phase reveal 
a very satisfactory performance. In general, performance after training was very successful 
as indicated by the Correlation Coefficient (CC), while the Normalised Root Mean 
Squared Error (NRMSE) indicates that predictions were by far better than the simple mean 
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forecaster (NRMSE equal to 1). The deviation between actual and predicted samples, as 
indicated on the basis of the Mean Relative Error (MRE), the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) 
and the Mean Square Error (MSE) is negligible. As a result, the ability of the networks to 
generalise the knowledge embodied through the learning process during the testing phase 
is considerably high, as assessed on the basis of the corresponding errors for the out-of-
sample data.  
More specifically, the forecasting performance during the testing phase is quite successful 
in CC terms, which in certain networks, like C(2), C(3) and C(4) reached an approximate 
84-89% follow up of the original series. Regarding prediction accuracy, the MSE, MRE 
and MAE error indicators exhibit low values in all networks, while the NRMSE figures 
indicate a slightly inferior behaviour compared to a simple mean predictor in most of the 
cases, with the exception of A(2) and all networks constituting the C category. The 
network that yields the most accurate predictions regarding all error measures used is C(2) 
(Figure 2), while the predictions of the rest C-category networks are also quite 
satisfactory. Finally, concerning the rest two network categories, only one network, 
namely A(2) presented a forecasting performance which can be considered as equally 
successful.       
 Before we move to examining how the relative security of the two allies may be 
affected in the context of alternative arms race scenarios, we turn to investigate the leading 
determinants of the relative security between Cyprus and Greece, facing the possibility of 
a Turkish threat. Input sensitivity analysis was performed for all networks used, following 
the learning phase, with the summation of weights corresponding to each input node 
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(variable) presented in Table 4 in descending order.  The findings of our experiments seem 
to be very much in line with earlier research on this topic (Andreou and Zombanakis 
2000). Indeed, all experiments agree that the share of defence in the GDP of Turkey is 
clearly the top determinant of the Greek - Cypriot relative security. In most cases the 
Greek and Cypriot GDP shares of non - defence expenditure are the next two most 
important determinants of the relative security between the two allies. This finding 
underlines the importance of the trade - off between defence and non - defence spending 
and the extent to which the sacrifice of the peace dividend as a result of this specific arms 
race is too important to be overlooked, a conclusion which seems to agree with most of the 
literature (e.g. Hartley and Hooper 1990; Gleditsch et al. 1996). 
 Having identified the leading determinants of the relative security of the two allies 
with reference to Turkey, we may now proceed to study the simulation results of the 
networks forecasts of our relative security measure in the context of various arms race 
scenarios. The forecasting horizon included in the testing phase of the networks reaches 
the year 2002 and the results obtained confirm the findings of the literature on arms races 
and the various strategy payoffs (e.g. Wolfson 1985). The advantage of our method, 
however, lies with the possibility offered to substitute measurable payoffs for 
hypothetical, arbitrary values, thus obtaining a more meaningful cardinal measurement of 
the results of an arms race in the context of the Integrated Defence Space Doctrine. The 
scenarios selected are the usual ones involved in a typical arms race examined via game 
theory, or in the context of the “prisoner’s dilemma” (e.g. Majeski 1984). We assign, 
therefore, increasing or decreasing future values to the GDP shares of defence expenditure 
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of Greece and Cyprus on one hand and Turkey on another4, thus referring to the following 
four scenarios, with the terms “reduction” and “escalation” suggesting a respective 
decrease or increase of the GDP share of defence expenditure of the country or countries 
involved:   
i. Both sides escalate. 
ii. Greece and Cyprus escalate and Turkey reduces. 
iii. Turkey escalates and Greece and Cyprus reduce. 
iv. Both sides reduce. 
Prediction of the future course of the RS coefficient in the context of the scenarios 
described above was performed using the C(2) network which achieved the highest 
forecasting performance during all earlier simulations. 
 As the prediction results in Table 5 indicate, RS behaves as expected, according to 
the theoretical basis stated earlier. The best outlook is provided in the case in which both 
sides choose to reduce tension by contracting their defence expenditure, as this is 
described by the GDP ratio of military expenditure, a finding to be expected bearing in 
mind the peace dividend for both sides as described in the literature (Balfousias and 
Stavrinos 1996; Ozmucur 1996). In this case, the Greece - Cyprus relative security 
coefficient RS for the five years forecasted assumes an average value of 4.82, the highest 
of all scenarios. The second best option, however, seems to be the case in which both sides 
resort to an arms race, this providing for an average 5 year RS forecasted value of 4.55. 
                                                     
4 The choice of the defence expenditure as a share of the GDP rather than the level of the military 
expenditure itself is widely used in the literature and aims at introducing, to a certain extent at least, the 
question of sustainability of the defence burden by relating it to the total output of an economy. 
 16
The advocates of the “si vis pacem para bellum”5 doctrine, however, will be delighted to 
observe that the year 2002 value of the RS coefficient in this scenario is practically equal 
to the corresponding value of the case in which both sides select the reduced defence 
spending policy.  This finding is very interesting, since it underlines the importance of the 
arms race on the security of the alliance members. The cases in which one of the two 
parties emphasises military spending, while the other reduces, also appear to be very 
interesting. Indeed, the average RS value for the five - year period forecasted is 2.93 in the 
case in which Greece and Cyprus increase their GDP share of defence expenditure, while 
Turkey reduces it. This conclusion is very much in line with both the established 
theoretical framework (e.g. Hartley and Sandler 1995), as well as elementary reasoning, 
given that the RS reflects the relative security of the Greek - Cypriot side. It is also 
interesting to point out that the RS figures in all scenarios increase together with the time 
horizon, with the exception of those derived in the fourth scenario, namely the one in 
which Turkey escalates while Greece and Cyprus limit their defence expenditure. In this 
case the average of the RS figures, which decline with time up to 2002, does not exceed 
0.4, a very low value for the security of the two allies, as expected. The graphical 
description of the results referring to all four scenaria as discussed above is shown in 
Figure 3. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this paper has been to contribute to the cardinal measurement of an arms 
race impact upon the security of two allies involved in such a race against a potential 
                                                     
5 The Latin for “if you want peace prepare for war” 
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adversary. The analysis refers to the co-operation between Greece and Cyprus in the area 
of national security, something that has already been materialised in the context of the so-
called Integrated Defence Space Doctrine. Our efforts have focused on supplementing the 
available literature on arms races by suggesting the introduction of a payoff relative 
security coefficient, emphasising the dominant role of human resources in this case and 
measuring the impact on the military security of the two allies as a result of an arms race 
against a third party, namely Turkey.  
The main conclusion drawn after a variety of scenarios have been tried is that the 
short and medium term relative security of Cyprus and Greece is maximised when both 
sides involved in the arms race reduce their defence expenditures, while the arms race 
scenario appears as a second-best choice. When it comes to the long-run, however, it is 
interesting to see that the Greece-Cyprus relative security index assumes its maximum 
value in the context of an arms race between Greece and Cyprus on one hand and Turkey 
on the other. This finding supports the view of those who believe that despite the peace 
dividend (Balfousias and Stavrinos 1996), Greece has no choice but to follow up the 
ambitious 25-year Turkish armaments programme. Finally, the results of the “Turkey 
escalates-Cyprus and Greece reduce” scenario are discouraging due to their lowest relative 
security values and, consequently, their poor contribution to peace promotion, something 
that must be taken to consideration by the one - sided disarmament policy followers.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Variables, Data and Sources 
 
 
Code Data Series Source 
GGDPCS GDP of Greece, Constant Prices Greek National 
Accounts 
CGDPCS GDP of Cyprus, Constant Prices Cypriot National 
Accounts 
TGDPCS GDP of Turkey, Constant Prices International Financial 
Statistics, IMF 
GDEFCRS Defence Expenditure of Greece (share of 
GDP) 
SIPRI 
CDEFCRS Defence Expenditure of Cyprus (share of 
GDP) 
SIPRI 
TDEFCRS Defence Expenditure of Turkey (share of 
GDP) 
SIPRI 
GNDEFCRS Non-Defence Expenditure of Greece 
(share of GDP) 
Greek National 
Accounts 
CNDEFCRS Non-Defence Expenditure of Cyprus 
(share of GDP) 
Cypriot National 
Accounts 
 
 
 Table 2: Neural network architectures, activation functions and encoding. 
 
Network 
Architecture*
 
Hidden Layer(s) Activation Function(s) 
 
Code 
8-10-1 Logistic sigmoid A(1) 
8-10-1 Hyberbolic tangent A(2) 
8-14-1 Logistic sigmoid A(3) 
8-14-1 Hyberbolic tangent A(4) 
8-10-5-1 Logistic sigmoid B(1) 
8-10-5-1 Hyberbolic tangent B(2) 
8-15-8-1 Logistic sigmoid B(3) 
8-15-8-1 Hyberbolic tangent B(4) 
8-3-3-3-1 1
st slab: Gaussian, 2nd slab: Hyberbolic 
tangent; 3rd slab: Gaussian complementary 
C(1) 
8-3-3-3-1 1
st slab: Gaussian, 2nd slab: Gaussian 
complementary; 3rd slab: Hyberbolic tangent
C(2) 
8-3-5-8-1 1
st slab: Gaussian, 2nd slab: Hyberbolic 
tangent; 3rd slab: Gaussian complementary 
C(3) 
8-3-5-8-1 1
st slab: Gaussian, 2nd slab: Gaussian 
complementary; 3rd slab: Hyberbolic tangent
C(4) 
 
* “m-d-n” stands for m input nodes, d nodes in the hidden layer and n output nodes. 
  “m-d-p-n” stands for m input nodes, d nodes in the first hidden layer, p nodes in the 
second hidden layer and n output nodes. 
  “m-d-p-k-n” stands for m input nodes, d hidden nodes in the first slab (total hidden 
neurons subset) of the hidden layer, p hidden nodes in the second slab, k hidden 
nodes in the third slab and n output nodes. 
 
 
Table 3: Forecasting performance and error figures 
 
 
Network 
Training Phase Testing Phase 
 NRMSE MSE CC MRE MAE NRMSE MSE CC MRE MAE 
A(1) 0.0613          0.00430 0.9980 0.0642 0.0445 1.0871 0.6909 0.7594 0.4779 0.4453
A(2) 0.0340          0.00130 0.9994 0.0393 0.0258 0.9425 0.5194 0.7526 0.5309 0.4613
A(3) 0.0644          0.00470 0.9978 0.0713 0.0479 1.0683 0.6672 0.7537 0.5006 0.4536
A(4) 0.0354          0.00140 0.9994 0.0372 0.0258 1.0518 0.6467 0.7589 0.4901 0.4523
B(1) 0.0619          0.00430 0.9980 0.0636 0.0426 1.1511 0.7746 0.7604 0.4908 0.4642
B(2) 0.0236          0.00120 0.9994 0.0332 0.0211 1.2462 0.9079 0.7598 0.5322 0.5282
B(3) 0.0738          0.00620 0.9972 0.0800 0.0592 1.1167 0.7290 0.7638 0.4305 0.4115
B(4) 0.0183          0.00030 0.9998 0.0176 0.0124 1.1554 0.7805 0.7588 0.5357 0.5151
C(1) 0.0113          0.00010 0.9999 0.0103 0.0066 0.7650 0.2264 0.8795 0.3689 0.2993
C(2)           0.0070 0.00005 1.0000 0.0057 0.0041 0.6858 0.2183 0.8854 0.3338 0.2217
C(3) 0.0037          0.00001 1.0000 0.0032 0.0025 0.8352 0.3683 0.8486 0.3806 0.4389
C(4) 0.0125          0.00010 0.9999 0.0095 0.0075 0.8511 0.2889 0.8367 0.3785 0.3199
Table 4: Input significance analysis (percentage in parentheses) 
 
Input variables significance ordering (descending) Neural 
Network 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
TDEFCRS        CGDPCS GNDEFCRS GDEFCRS GGDPCS CNDEFCRS TGDPCS CDEFCRS
A(1) (24.12)        (16.76) (14.08) (11.91) (10.70) (8.76) (7.48) (6.20)
TDEFCRS        GNDEFCRS CGDPCS GDEFCRS CDEFCRS CNDEFCRS GGDPCS TGDPCS
A(2) (21.65)        (17.69) (14.49) (12.56) (11.40) (8.75) (8.33) (5.13)
TDEFCRS        GNDEFCRS CGDPCS TGDPCS GDEFCRS CNDEFCRS GGDPCS CDEFCRS
A(3) (22.21)        (17.49) (15.84) (10.03) (9.33) (8.78) (8.74) (7.58)
TDEFCRS        GNDEFCRS TGDPCS CGDPCS GGDPCS GDEFCRS CNDEFCRS CDEFCRS
A(4) (23.11)        (16.37) (11.52) (11.51) (10.51) (9.99) (8.83) (8.17)
TDEFCRS        (CGDPCS GNDEFCRS GGDPCS CNDEFCRS GDEFCRS TGDPCS CDEFCRS
B(1) (25.43)        (17.56) (13.74) (10.56) (9.65) (9.22) (8.09) (5.75)
TDEFCRS        GNDEFCRS CGDPCS GDEFCRS GGDPCS CNDEFCRS CDEFCRS TGDPCS
B(2) (22.50)        (14.70) (14.26) (12.24) (9.96) (9.25) (8.89) (8.18)
TDEFCRS        CGDPCS GNDEFCRS GGDPCS GDEFCRS CNDEFCRS TGDPCS CDEFCRS
B(3) (20.51)        (19.38) (11.51) (11.35) (10.60) (9.58) (9.37) (7.71)
TDEFCRS        GNDEFCRS GDEFCRS CGDPCS GGDPCS CNDEFCRS CDEFCRS TGDPCS
B(4) (18.53)        (15.19) (13.32) (12.56) (12.50) (11.35) (9.90) (6.66)
TDEFCRS        GNDEFCRS GGDPCS GDEFCRS CNDEFCRS CGDPCS CDEFCRS TGDPCS
C(1) (25.10)        (15.44) (14.11) (13.18) (9.87) (8.98) (7.47) (5.85)
TDEFCRS        GNDEFCRS CNDEFCRS CGDPCS GGDPCS GDEFCRS TGDPCS CDEFCRS
C(2) (20.67)        (19.64) (12.26) (11.26) (10.92) (10.89) (8.20) (6.17)
TDEFCRS        GNDEFCRS CNDEFCRS CGDPCS GDEFCRS GGDPCS CDEFCRS TGDPCS
C(3) (19.82)        (15.41) (12.36) (12.25) (11.71) (10.13) (9.35) (8.97)
TDEFCRS        GNDEFCRS CNDEFCRS GDEFCRS CGDPCS GGDPCS TGDPCS CDEFCRS
C(4) (19.52)        (16.45) (11.99) (11.68) (11.51) (10.35) (10.23) (8.27)
 
Table 5: Case scenarios predictions on the Relative Security (RS) coefficient 
 
Scenario Year Predicted RS 
 1998 1.4469 
All countries 1999 2.4368 
escalate 2000 4.0670 
 2001 6.1940 
 2002 8.5902 
 1998 1.6812 
Cyprus and  1999 2.3682 
Greece escalate,  2000 2.9593 
Turkey reduces 2001 3.5439 
 2002 4.1159 
 1998 0.7649 
Turkey Escalates, 1999 0.6195 
Cyprus and 2000 0.3689 
Greece Reduce 2001 0.1808 
 2002 0.0675 
 1998 1.6406 
All countries 1999 3.0701 
reduce 2000 4.6800 
 2001 6.4924 
 2002 8.2233 
 
LEGENDS FOR FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: The Multiply Activated Multi-Layer Perceptron (MAMLP) neural network 
architecture. 
Figure 2: Actual versus predicted values of the Relative Security (RS) coefficient using 
an 8-3-3-3-1 MAMLP neural network architecture. 
Figure 3: Predicted values of the Relative Security (RS) coefficient for hypothetical 
scenaria, using an 8-3-3-3-1 MAMLP neural network architecture. 
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Relative Security (RS) Coefficient Predicted Values in Hypothetical Scenaria
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APPENDIX 
A.1 System design and implementation  
 The given time series x={x(t): 1 ≤ t≤ N} is divided into two sets: a training set  
xtrain={x(t):  1 ≤  t ≤ T}, and a test set xtest={x(t): T < t ≤ N}, where N is the length of the 
data series. The training phase presents the xtrain set to the network repeatedly until a 
certain level of convergence is achieved based on some error criterion. The learning 
algorithm adjusts the weights in each repetition in order to minimize the diversion of the 
desired value from the predicted one.  
The number of input neurons and the selection of the variables involved have been 
based on prior research on the topic, as stated in section 2, which has led to the choice 
of the input set which exhibits the highest performance in terms of prediction accuracy. 
We used several alternative configuration schemes, as regards the number of hidden 
layers and the nodes within each layer, in order, first to achieve best performance and 
second, to facilitate comparison between different network architectures (Table 2). 
Every input variable is associated with one neuron in the input layer.  
Determining the number of hidden layers and neurons in each layer can often be 
a very difficult task and possibly one of the major factors influencing the performance 
of the network. Too few neurons in a hidden layer may produce bias due to the 
constraint of the function space, which results to poor performance as the network 
embodies a very small portion of information presented. Too many neurons on the other 
hand may cause overfitting of data on one hand and increase considerably the amount of 
computational time needed for the network to process data on the other, something that 
will not necessarily lead to convergence. We therefore have used a variety of numbers 
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of neurons within one hidden layer, while in some cases a two-hidden-layer scheme was 
also developed in order to investigate whether performance is improved. 
 The number of iterations (epochs) presenting the whole pattern set during the 
learning phase is also very important. We have let this number vary during our 
simulations, since different network topologies, initial conditions and input sets, require 
different convergence and generalization times. The number of epochs our networks 
needed for convergence was 10,000, while the learning and momentum coefficients 
(Rumelhart and McLelland 1986; Azoff 1994) were kept constant at the positive values 
of 0.3 and 0.1 respectively. One should be very cautious though when using a large 
number of epochs, as the network may overfit the data thus failing to generalize. The 
problems of bias and data overfitting can be overcome by evaluating the performance of 
each network using a testing set of unseen patterns (testing phase). This set does not 
participate during the learning process (e.g. Azoff, 1994). If the network has actually 
learned the structure of the input series rather than memorizing it then it can perform 
well when the testing set is presented. Otherwise, if bias or overfitting is really the case, 
performance will be extremely poor on these “new” data values. Architecture selection 
is generally based on success during the testing phase, provided that the learning ability 
was satisfactory. 
 
A.2 Performance evaluation  
 
The CC measures the ability of the predicted samples to follow the upward or 
downward jumps of the original series. A CC value near 1 in absolute terms is 
interpreted as a perfect follow up of the original series by the forecasted one. A negative 
CC sign indicates that the forecasting series follows the same ups or downs of the 
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original series with a negative mirroring, that is with a 180o rotation about the time-axis. 
When the original series moves up, the forecasting moves down at the same time-period 
and vice versa. 
The NRMSE indicates whether prediction is better than a simple mean forecaster. If 
NRMSE=0 then predictions are perfect; NRMSE=1 indicates that prediction is no better 
than taking xpred equal to the x-mean.  
MRE shows the accuracy of predictions in percentage terms expressing it in a stricter 
way, since it focuses on the sample being predicted, not depending on the scale in which 
the data values are expressed or on the units of measurement used. Thus, we are able to 
estimate prediction error as a fraction of the actual value, this making the MRE the 
more objective error measure among the three used.  
MSE is reported in order to have the error condition met by the Back Propagation 
algorithm, while the MAE shows the divergence between actual and predicted samples 
in absolute measures. The above prediction error measures are given by the following 
equations: 
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where xact(i) and xpred(i) the actual and predicted value when pattern i is presented,  
npred,nact, x,x  the mean value of actual and predicted samples of length n 
and n is the total number of  patterns. 
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